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Abstract 
We study jointly the roles of aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainty shocks in driving business cycle 
fluctuations. By decomposing total stock return volatility of over 20,000 publicly-listed US firms from 
1962 to 2012, we construct separate indices for aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainty, and run a 
horse race between them in an otherwise standard macroeconomic VAR. We find that idiosyncratic 
uncertainty shocks account for a large fraction of fluctuations in economic activity at business cycle 
frequencies, whereas the impacts of aggregate uncertainty are negligible. Idiosyncratic uncertainty, 
and not aggregate uncertainty, shocks produce the “sharp drop and rapid rebound” response in 
activity characterized in Bloom (2009). Idiosyncratic uncertainty shocks to large firms have more 
powerful macroeconomic impacts than small firms, suggesting “Granular” origins to the role of 
uncertainty in the macroeconomy. We also find evidence of an economy-wide “buffering effect”, in 
which the effects of large and small firms’ shocks exhibit a negative covariance which dampens down 
the aggregate effects of idiosyncratic uncertainty shocks on economic fluctuations. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In recent times, much attention has been paid to the role played by uncertainty in the real 
economy. Of particular concern has been the sluggish nature of the US economy’s recent 
recovery from the Great Recession, which many commentators have attributed in large part 
to heightened levels of uncertainty, with, for example, the September 2012 Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC) meeting noting that “a high level of uncertainty regarding the 
European fiscal and banking crisis and the outlook for US fiscal and regulatory policies was 
weighing on confidence, thereby restraining household and business spending,” and former 
Chairmen Ben Bernanke1 indicating that “increases in risk aversion and uncertainty, together 
with tight credit conditions, may have impeded the commercial application of new 
technologies and slowed the pace of business formation.” 
Much of the existing debate has centred on the impacts of aggregate (or macroeconomic) 
uncertainty. However, it has long been known that idiosyncratic uncertainty also exhibits 
significant stochastic time variation (notably from the well-known paper of Campbell, 
Lettau, Malkiel and Xu (2001), henceforth referred to as CLMX (2001)). In this paper, we 
study jointly the roles of aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainty shocks in driving business 
cycle fluctuations. We construct separate indices for aggregate and idiosyncratic 
uncertainty, and run a horse race between them in an otherwise standard macroeconomic 
VAR model. Our results are quite striking – whereas idiosyncratic uncertainty shocks are 
found to be a key driver of the business cycle, accounting for a large fraction of fluctuations 
in economic activity, the effects of aggregate uncertainty shocks are negligible. 
Following the seminal paper of Bloom (2009), a burgeoning recent literature has emerged 
examining the effects of shocks to uncertainty in driving macroeconomic fluctuations2. The 
novel contributions of our paper can be outlined as follows. First, the existing literature has 
yielded somewhat inconclusive findings, with numerous papers finding aggregate 
                                                          
1
 Former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke’s speech at the Economic Club of New York, 
November 20, 2012. 
2
 Other innovations to the conventional approaches of modelling technology, preferences and policy shocks 
have been proposed recently. In particular, in a ground-breaking paper, Angeletos et al. (2014) explore the role 
of variation in “confidence” about the state of the economy, finding it accounts for about one half of GDP 
uncertainty at business-cycle frequencies. 
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uncertainty to be a dominant force in business cycle fluctuations (Alexopoulos and Cohen 
(2009); Baker et al. (2013); Baker and Bloom (2012); Benigno et al. (2012); Bloom (2009), 
Caggiano et al. (2014); Gilchrist et al. (2013); Mumtaz and Surico (2013); Mumtaz and 
Zanetti (2013);  while others find it has little impact at the macroeconomic level (Bachman 
and Bayer (2013); Bachmann et al. (2013); Bekaert et al. (2013); Born and Pfeifer (2014)) 
and yet others more attribute these effects to idiosyncratic, not aggregate, uncertainty 
(Arellano, Bai and Kehoe (2012); Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2012)). But the majority 
of these papers study the effects of either aggregate uncertainty or idiosyncratic uncertainty 
in isolation. Our paper is different in that we combine both sources of uncertainty in a single 
model and analyze jointly their effects, in order to shed light on their relative importance in 
explaining macroeconomic fluctuations. Bloom et al. (2012)) appears to be the only other 
paper which studies both shocks in tandem. They quantify the impact of time-varying 
uncertainty on the economy in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with 
heterogeneous firms, but they find that both types of uncertainty have significant impacts 
on economic activity. Their approach differs in three respects, first they estimate their 
uncertainty indices by measuring the dispersion of plant-level shocks to total factor 
productivity (TFP), whereas we use stock return data to measure uncertainty. Second, our 
modelling choices differ, they formulate a DSGE model, whereas we estimate VAR models. 
Third, other than the variance of shocks, aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainty are 
observationally equivalent in their DSGE model, hence they do not allow for potential 
differences in the propagation mechanisms and dynamic responses of the two types of 
uncertainty shocks. 
Our second contribution is to investigate the transmission mechanisms of uncertainty 
shocks to the real economy. The existing literature identifies three key channels – first, in 
Bloom (2009), greater uncertainty increases the real option value to waiting, hence firms 
scale back their investment and hiring plans. This induces a characteristic “sharp drop and 
rapid rebound” profile of responses. There is a sharp drop in activity, as firms scale back 
their plans rapidly (since expectations change with the onset of the uncertainty shock), 
followed by a rapid rebound, as firms address their pent-up demand for labour and capital, 
after the uncertainty shock subsides. Second, in Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2012) 
(henceforth referred to as CMR), higher idiosyncratic risk induces tighter credit conditions, 
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hence borrowing firms are constrained to scale back their investment plans. Third, in 
Arellano, Bai and Kehoe (2012) (henceforth referred to as ABK), hiring inputs is risky 
because financial frictions limit firms’ ability to insure against shocks that occur between the 
time of production and the receipt of revenues. Hence, an increase in idiosyncratic 
uncertainty induces firms to reduce their inputs to reduce exposure to such risk. But it is 
plausible that smaller firms would be more significantly affected than larger firms under the 
second and third channels. Large firms tend to be more immune to bank credit rationing, 
given that they are better able to draw on internal equity, due to stronger balance sheets 
and liquidity positions, and also able to access the public equity and bond markets3, which 
are closed to small firms4. 
On both counts, our evidence favours the “Bloom channel”. We find evidence of the 
characteristic “sharp drop and rapid rebound” profile of responses in activity following 
idiosyncratic uncertainty shocks, but interestingly, different to Bloom, not with aggregate 
uncertainty shocks. The effects of these shocks, in contrast, are shallower and more 
protracted in nature. Furthermore, our evidence contradicts the “CMR” and “ABK” channels, 
in that we find that idiosyncratic uncertainty shocks to large firms have a significantly more 
powerful effect on output fluctuations than small firms. 
We build a proxy for idiosyncratic uncertainty using the methodology developed in CLMX 
(2001). Specifically, we measure idiosyncratic returns as the difference between firm-level 
and market returns, using daily data for over 20,000 publicly-listed US firms from 1962 to 
2012. We measure within-month volatility of returns by computing the variance of daily 
returns, which yields a sample of over three million firm-month observations on volatility 
data. We use these to construct the idiosyncratic uncertainty index by aggregating across all 
firms, on a month-by-month basis, by taking the value-weighted average of individual firm 
volatilities. Similarly, we construct an index of aggregate uncertainty by estimating the 
                                                          
3
 Adrian, Colla and Shin (2012) find evidence of such a substitution effect, in that although bank lending to 
firms declined during the recent financial crisis, bond financing actually increased to make up much of the gap. 
4
 It is also plausible that the “sharp drop and rapid rebound” profile of responses would not be observed under 
this channel. Tighter credit conditions tend to bite only with a lag, since firms generally maintain a 
“precautionary” buffer stock of unused credit, and hence can draw down existing, pre-arranged credit lines. A 
rapid recovery is also unlikely, as tighter credit rationing tends to persist until long after the episode of higher 
cashflow uncertainty resulting from the uncertainty shock has subsided. 
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within-month volatility of aggregate returns. We then append both indices to a 
parsimonious macroeconomic VAR, consisting of real industrial production, inflation, and 
the Federal Funds rate, which is estimated on US monthly data from 1962 to 2012, with 
identification imposed via the Cholesky decomposition. 
Next, we decompose the idiosyncratic uncertainty index into two sub-indices, one for large 
and one for small firms. We rank firms on a year-by-year basis according to annual average 
market capitalization, and include only the largest 100 firms in the large firm index (which 
account for approximately 40-50% of the total market over our sample period), and put all 
remaining firms in the small firms index. We then replicate the original VAR model, but 
substitute the whole economy idiosyncratic uncertainty index with the disaggregated 
counterpart for large firms, and then repeat again using the small firms index5. 
Our main results are outlined as follows. We find that idiosyncratic uncertainty shocks 
account for approximately 30% of volatility in industrial production at business cycle 
frequencies, larger than the share attributed to monetary policy shocks. Moreover, breaking 
the sample at 1990 to exclude the possibility of structural breaks, this share increases to 
around 45%. They lead to a significant decline in growth in production, which falls rapidly 
over the course of a year, and then rebounds sharply, almost back to trend within the next 6 
months. In contrast, the share attributed to aggregate uncertainty shocks is little more than 
5%. Whereas idiosyncratic uncertainty is a primitive force driving macroeconomic 
fluctuations, fluctuations in aggregate uncertainty are mostly an endogenous response to 
other disturbances in the macroeconomy. Our results are robust to a variety of checks, 
including different orderings of variables in the VAR, existence of structural breaks, de-
trending of volatility series, problems of over-parameterization, and exclusion of the 
Dotcom bubble and Lehman’s collapse. 
Regarding the sectoral decomposition of idiosyncratic uncertainty shocks, we find that for 
large firms, the proportion of fluctuations in growth accounted for is actually higher at 
                                                          
5
 Although it might seem more straightforward to include both the large and small firms uncertainty indices 
simultaneously in the VAR, rather than studying their effects sequentially as we do, this leads to a serious 
problem of over-parameterization, resulting in significant loss of estimation efficiency (with the IRFs having 
large confidence bands, and the FEVDS displaying implausible results. However, for robustness, we include 
both the large and small firms uncertainty series simultaneously in a more parsimonious version of the VAR, 
with some endogenous variables omitted (see section 6 below). 
6 
 
approximately 35% after 2 years, whereas for small firms it is lower at approximately 25% at 
a similar forecast horizon. A puzzling finding is that the sum of the contributions of large and 
small firms exceeds significantly that of idiosyncratic uncertainty in the whole economy -
around 30% of output fluctuations is missing. Our resolution of this puzzle is down to the 
existence of an economy-wide “buffering effect” – volatility fluctuations in the large and 
small firms sector appear to co-move with output in opposite directions over certain stages 
of the business cycle, which dampens down the aggregate effects of idiosyncratic 
uncertainty shocks on growth. 
Our results also relate to the well-known “Granular Hypothesis” of Gabaix (2011), which 
shows that if the size distribution of firms is sufficiently fat-tailed, as is documented 
empirically, then even if shocks are independently distributed, the conditions under which 
the Central Limit Theorem hold are no longer satisfied, so that the well-known 
diversification argument no longer holds, and hence idiosyncratic shocks, in particular 
shocks to large firms, can survive in the aggregate. Hence, our results that idiosyncratic 
uncertainty shocks to large firms have more significant aggregate effects than small firms 
suggest there may be granular origins to the role of uncertainty in business cycle 
fluctuations (although the key difference is that whereas Gabaix focusses on time variation 
in the first moment, we focus on time variation in the second moment). 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 details the measurement of 
the aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainty indices, and describes the volatility data. Section 
3 outlines the model specification, and discusses data and estimation issues. Section 4 
presents the results, whilst section 5 goes into further detail on the disaggregated effects of 
large and small firms’ uncertainty shocks. Section 6 checks the robustness of our results and 
section 7 concludes. 
2. Measurement of aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainty 
 
We follow the methodology of CLMX (2001), who decompose the total return volatility of an 
individual firm into its constituent components, which has the appealing property that it 
allows us to extract the idiosyncratic component without the need to estimate covariances 
or betas for individual firms. But whereas they disaggregate into three components: 
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aggregate volatility, industry-specific volatility and firm-specific (idiosyncratic) volatility, we 
adhere to the traditional CAPM paradigm and decompose return volatility into only two 
components – aggregate and idiosyncratic volatility6. We start off by presenting the 
traditional CAPM decomposition (which requires estimation of betas), then apply the more 
tractable decomposition of CLMX (2001) (which does not). 
Let 𝑅𝑖𝑡 denote the excess return of firm i in period t. Let 𝑤𝑖𝑡 denote the weight of firm i in 
the total market, where weights are defined according to market capitalization. Then the 
excess market return is simply the value-weighted average of the individual firm excess 
returns: 
 𝑅𝑚𝑡 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑡
𝑖
𝑅𝑖𝑡  (1) 
Next, from CAPM we can write: 
 𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜖?̃?𝑡 (2) 
where 𝛽𝑖 denotes the beta for firm i with respect to the market return and 𝜖?̃?𝑡 denotes the 
firm-specific residual. As is standard in CAPM, 𝜖?̃?𝑡 is orthogonal to the market return, which 
enables the following variance decomposition: 
 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽𝑖
2𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑚𝑡) + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜖?̃?𝑡) (3) 
Hence, it is clear to see that the CAPM decomposition requires estimation of betas. Next, we 
turn to the CLMX (2001) decomposition.  Let 𝜖𝑖𝑡 be defined as the difference between the 
firm-level return 𝑅𝑖𝑡 and the market return 𝑅𝑚𝑡, i.e. 
 𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (4) 
Substituting in from (2) and re-arranging yields: 
 𝜖𝑖𝑡 = 𝜖?̃?𝑡 + (𝛽𝑖 − 1)𝑅𝑚𝑡 (5) 
Hence, computing the variance decomposition of (4) and taking into account (5), yields: 
                                                          
6
 Relating our approach to theirs, it is easily shown that our measure of idiosyncratic volatility simply bundles 
together their measures of firm-specific and industry-specific volatility. 
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 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑖𝑡) = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑚𝑡) + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜖𝑖𝑡) + 2𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑚𝑡, 𝜖𝑖𝑡) 
= 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑚𝑡) + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜖𝑖𝑡) + 2(𝛽𝑖 − 1) 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑚𝑡) 
(6) 
Note that although the variance of individual firm returns contains covariance terms, if we 
aggregate across all firms by taking the weighted average of individual variances: 
 ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑡
𝑖
 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑖𝑡) =  𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑚𝑡) + ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑡
𝑖
 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜖𝑖𝑡) = 𝜎𝑚𝑡
2 + 𝜎𝜖𝑡
2  (7) 
we find that the individual betas drop out given the standard property of CAPM that 
∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑡𝛽𝑖𝑚 = 1𝑖 . Thus, we can use the firm-specific residuals 𝜖𝑖𝑡 to construct an index of 
idiosyncratic volatility, without the need to estimate betas. Finally, we show how our 
measure of idiosyncratic volatility relates to the “true” measure based on CAPM. 
Using (5) and computing the variance decomposition of 𝜖𝑖𝑡, we get: 
 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜖𝑖𝑡) = (𝛽𝑖 − 1)
2 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑚𝑡) + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜖?̃?𝑡) (8) 
Aggregating (8) across all firms yields: 
 𝜎𝜖𝑡
2 = ?̃?𝜖𝑡
2 + 𝐶𝑆𝑉𝑡(𝛽𝑖𝑚)𝜎𝑚𝑡
2  (9) 
where ?̃?𝜖𝑡
2 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜖?̃?𝑡)𝑖  is the average variance of the CAPM firm-specific residual 𝜖?̃?𝑡, 
and 𝐶𝑆𝑉𝑡(𝛽𝑖𝑚) = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑡(𝛽𝑖 − 1)
2
𝑖  is the cross-sectional variance of betas across all firms in 
the market. Equation (9) shows that our measure of idiosyncratic volatility contains two 
components, the first term represents the intrinsic measure of idiosyncratic volatility a la 
CAPM, and the second term depends on the cross-sectional variance of individual firm betas 
and market volatility. However, according to CLMX (2001), plausible estimates of cross-
sectional variance in betas are sufficiently small, such that the second component accounts 
for only a small fraction of time variation in the volatility series. Thus, our measure of 
idiosyncratic volatility can be viewed as a decent proxy for the intrinsic measure derived 
from CAPM. 
Estimation 
We use firm-level return data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) US 
Stock Database for all firms trading on the NYSE, Amex and Nasdaq exchanges. Our sample 
period runs from July 1962 (daily data from the Amex exchange only goes back this far) to 
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December 2012 (the latest available data point). The total number of firms increases from 
3256 to 5567 over this period, with the coverage peaking at 9837 in 1999.7 
We replicate the methodology (with some modifications) of CLMX (2001) to estimate the 
volatility series 𝜎𝜖𝑡
2  and 𝜎𝑚𝑡
2  (see their paper for a more detailed description). Excess returns 
are defined as the spread over the 30 day Treasury bill rate (computed at the equivalent 
daily rate). We estimate the within-month volatility of excess market returns by computing: 
 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 = ∑(𝑅𝑚𝑠 − 𝜇𝑚)
2
𝑠∈𝑡
 (10) 
where 𝜇𝑚 is defined as the within-month sample mean of the market return 𝑅𝑚𝑠, and 
estimate the within-month volatility of idiosyncratic residuals by computing: 
 ?̂?𝜖𝑖𝑡
2 = ∑ 𝜖𝑖𝑠
2
𝑠∈𝑡
 (11) 
As explained above, we aggregate across all firms in the sample by computing the value-
weighted average of individual firm volatilities: 
 𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑡 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑡?̂?𝜖𝑖𝑡
2
𝑖
 (12) 
to give us our idiosyncratic volatility index. 
Descriptive analysis 
It is useful to begin with a descriptive analysis of our volatility time series. Figures 1 to 4 plot 
the four monthly volatility series, which have been annualized (by multiplying by 12). The 
top panels plot the raw data, whereas the bottom panels plot a smoothed series (estimated 
as a 12 month backward moving average). To begin with, we update the results on trends in 
volatility in CLMX (2001)8. Consistent with their paper, we find evidence of a clear, upward 
trend in idiosyncratic volatility during the 1960-2000 period (this is more evident in the 
smoothed graph, which strips out the high frequency noise and focusses on the slow-
                                                          
7
 A large number of firms de-list following the shakeouts of the 2000 Dotcom bust and 2008 financial crisis. 
8
 Their time series end in 1997 (the latest available data point at their time of writing), where ours continue to 
2012. 
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moving component). However, from around 2000 onwards, this gives way to a downward 
trend9. Furthermore, looking at the disaggregated idiosyncratic volatility series (Figures 3  
 
 
FIGURE 1: ANNUALIZED IDIOSYNCRATIC VOLATILITY 
The top panel shows the annualized variance within each month of daily firm-level returns relative to the 
market, calculated using equations (11) and (12), for the period July 1962 to December 2012. The bottom 
panel shows a backwards 12-month moving average of FIRM. The series have been truncated where volatility 
exceeds 0.5. 
 
                                                          
9
 Zhang (2010) also finds evidence of upward trend in idiosyncratic uncertainty from 1980 until 2000, and a 
downward trend after 2000. 
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FIGURE 2: ANNUALIZED AGGREGATE VOLATILITY 
The top panel shows the annualized variance within each month of daily market returns, calculated using 
equation (10), for the period July 1962 to December 2012. The bottom panel shows a backwards 12-month 
moving average of MKT. The series have been truncated where volatility exceeds 0.4. 
and 4), it is clear that the trend component we observe is almost entirely driven by the small 
firms sector, with large firms exhibiting no obvious trend in volatility. In contrast, aggregate 
volatility exhibits no discernible trend over the entire time series. 
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FIGURE 3: ANNUALIZED IDIOSYNCRATIC VOLATILITY (LARGE FIRMS) 
The top panel shows the annualized variance within each month of daily firm-level returns relative to the 
market, calculated using equations (11) and (12), for the period July 1962 to December 2012, for the largest 
100 firms only (according to market capitalization). The bottom panel shows a backwards 12-month moving 
average of the same series. 
 
A casual inspection (in particular of the smoothed graphs) reveals a high degree of 
comovement between aggregate volatility and idiosyncratic volatility. Both series show 
spikes in the mid-1970s (coinciding with the first oil shock), and also the financial crisis of  
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FIGURE 4: ANNUALIZED IDIOSYNCRATIC VOLATILITY (SMALL FIRMS) 
The top panel shows the annualized variance within each month of daily firm-level returns relative to the 
market, calculated using equations (11) and (12), for the period July 1962 to December 2012, excluding the 
largest 100 firms (according to market capitalization). The bottom panel shows a backwards 12-month moving 
average of the same series. The series have been truncated where volatility exceeds 0.4. 
2008. However, the comovement is less pronounced for some episodes, for example, there 
is a large spike in 1987 for aggregate volatility (due to the stock market crash), but a less 
significant increase for idiosyncratic volatility. Interestingly, the reverse situation occurs 
during the Dotcom Bust of 2000. 
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FIGURE 5: IDIOSYNCRATIC VOLATILITY (DE-TRENDED) 
This shows the annualized variance within each month of daily firm-level returns relative to the market, 
calculated using equations (11) and (12) for the period July 1962 to December 2012, which is then de-trended 
using the Hodrick-Prescott filter (setting the appropriate Ravn-Uhlig value for monthly data of λ = 129,600), 
and smoothed by taking a backwards 12-month moving average. 
 
Moreover, there are some episodes where the series seem to move quite differently. This 
becomes more distinct when we de-trend and smooth the volatility series10. For instance, in 
the early 1980s, idiosyncratic volatility increases above trend, but aggregate volatility stays 
muted11 (see Figures 5 and 6). We also see the opposite effects occurring around 2011, with 
aggregate volatility ticking up, but idiosyncratic volatility remaining relatively subdued. 
We also observe a very high degree of comovement between the disaggregated volatility 
series (again this is more visible in the de-trended and smoothed graphs, Figures 7 and 8). 
The key difference is that idiosyncratic volatility of small firms is significantly higher than 
that of large firms. 
                                                          
10
 We detrend using the Hodrick-Prescott filter (setting the appropriate Ravn-Uhlig value for monthly data of λ 
= 129,600), and smooth as before by taking a backwards 12 month moving average. 
11
 This episode is particularly unusual as it is one of the few recessionary episodes in which aggregate 
uncertainty does not show a sharp increase. But this might be due to the unusual nature of this recession, in 
that unlike other severe recessions, credit conditions did not tighten significantly (see Bijapur (2010)). Thus, 
small firms, which tend to be more affected by external financing constraints, may have been spared the worst 
effects of the recession, and thus uncertainty was less of a market-wide phenomenon. Indeed, looking at the 
disaggregated series, we find that uncertainty in the large firms sector increases more significantly than the 
small firms sector. 
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FIGURE 6: AGGREGATE VOLATILITY (DE-TRENDED) 
This shows the annualized variance within each month of daily market returns, calculated using equation (10), 
for the period July 1962 to December 2012, which is then de-trended using the Hodrick-Prescott filter (setting 
the appropriate Ravn-Uhlig value for monthly data of λ = 129,600), and smoothed by taking a backwards 12-
month moving average. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 7: IDIOSYNCRATIC VOLATILITY – LARGE FIRMS (DE-TRENDED) 
This shows the annualized variance within each month of daily firm-level returns relative to the market, 
calculated using equations (11) and (12), for the period July 1962 to December 2012, for the largest 100 firms 
only (according to market capitalization), which is then de-trended using the Hodrick-Prescott filter (setting the 
appropriate Ravn-Uhlig value for monthly data of λ = 129,600), and smoothed by taking a backwards 12-month 
moving average. 
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FIGURE 8: IDIOSYNCRATIC VOLATILITY – SMALL FIRMS (DE-TRENDED) 
This shows the annualized variance within each month of daily firm-level returns relative to the market, 
calculated using equations (11) and (12), for the period July 1962 to December 2012, excluding the largest 100 
firms (according to market capitalization), which is then de-trended using the Hodrick-Prescott filter (setting 
the appropriate Ravn-Uhlig value for monthly data of λ = 129,600), and smoothed by taking a backwards 12-
month moving average. 
3. Model specification, data and estimation 
 
We model the macroeconomy using a stylized vector autoregression (VAR) consisting of real 
industrial production, inflation and the policy rate, which we expand to include our 
idiosyncratic and aggregate uncertainty indices. Although admittedly simple, it avoids the 
problem of over-parameterization, and also overcomes the need to make ad hoc identifying 
restrictions which would arise in a more extensive model. Furthermore, given that our main 
objective here is not to undertake a detailed analysis of the transmission mechanisms to an 
exhaustive set of macroeconomic aggregates, but instead to quantify the relative 
contributions of two different sources of uncertainty shocks, we believe our simpler 
approach suffices. 
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We impose identification through the Cholesky decomposition, which boils down to 
specifying the order in which shocks enter the system of equations in the VAR12. We specify 
the ordering of endogenous variables in the VAR as: 
 𝑋𝑡 = [𝐼𝑈𝑡, 𝐴𝑈𝑡, 𝑀𝑃𝑡 , 𝜋𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡]′ (13) 
where X denotes our vector of endogenous variables, IU denotes idiosyncratic uncertainty, 
AU denotes aggregate uncertainty, MP denotes the policy rate, π denotes inflation and y 
denotes industrial production. The assumptions underpinning this particular choice of 
ordering are based on Bloom (2009): (i) financial variables should be affected before real 
economy variables due to the efficient nature of financial markets, and (ii) prices tend to 
adjust to the impact of shocks before quantities. To these we add a third assumption: (iii) 
shocks affect idiosyncratic uncertainty first, and then propagate to aggregate uncertainty 
through the general equilibrium effects. We envisage this mechanism arising through the 
Granular Hypothesis of Gabaix (2011), namely shocks to individual, large firms could 
permeate throughout the economy as a whole due to the interconnectedness of firms13. We 
check the robustness of our results to a range of different orderings in section 6 below. 
Data and estimation 
Our estimations are based on US monthly data. Variables are specified as follows: real 
industrial production14 (seasonally adjusted, annual growth rates), inflation (Consumer Price 
                                                          
12 The complete structural VAR model can be characterized by three components: (1) the matrix of structural 
parameters (denoted A), (2) the matrices of lag coefficients (denoted Φ), and (3) the variance-covariance 
matrix of the structural innovations (denoted Ω), giving: 
 
 )(,)(  EXLAX ttt  
 
where tX  is the vector of endogenous variables and t  is the vector of structural innovations. The 
exclusion restrictions are applied to matrix A, which through the Cholesky decomposition has lower 
triangular form. 
13
 This choice of ordering is further justified by the results of our Granger causality tests, which indicate 
strongly that idiosyncratic uncertainty leads production, where there is no such unambiguous lead-lag 
relationship between aggregate uncertainty and production. Thus, ordering idiosyncratic uncertainty first 
avoids the possibility that the contribution of these shocks to fluctuations in production are incorrectly 
attributed to aggregate uncertainty shocks. 
14
 given that GDP data is unavailable at a monthly frequency. 
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Index for all urban consumers: all items (seasonally adjusted, annual growth rates), policy 
rate (Federal Funds target rate). All macroeconomic data are taken from the Global Financial 
Data database, and all stock market data from the CRSP database. We estimate the VAR 
over sample period July 1962 – Dec 2012. 
Preliminary inspection of the data reveals spikes in both uncertainty series due to the stock 
market crash of October 1987 and the Dotcom Bust of April 2000. The consensus view in the 
academic and policy literature seems to be that these episodes of turbulence were confined 
to financial markets and did not propagate to the real economy in any significant way. 
Hence, in order to prevent these one-off events from overpowering and distorting the 
estimation results, we exclude these outliers with time dummies. 
We undertake Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests for unit roots on all variables. Given the 
trade-off between too few lags (giving rise to potential serial correlation and bias of the test 
statistic), and too many lags (decreasing the power of the test), we test using both 1 and 9 
lags on the differences. In both cases, we reject the null of non-stationarity at the 1 per cent 
level for all variables, with the exception of the inflation variable and Federal Funds Rate, 
which are therefore de-trended using the Hodrick-Prescott filter (setting the appropriate 
Ravn-Uhlig value for monthly data of λ = 129,600). ADF tests on the de-trended series 
indicate the previously detected non-stationarity is eliminated. 
A potential complication in the analysis is that our results might reflect longer term 
comovements in the data, as oppose to the cyclical fluctuations which are the focus of our 
interest. Indeed, CLMX (2001) document strong evidence of an upward trend in 
idiosyncratic uncertainty within their sample, hence in order to isolate short run movements 
around these trends, we de-trend both our volatility time series before embarking on the 
VAR analysis. 
We include 25 lags of each variable in the VAR - the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test for 
optimal lag structure indicates the optimal number of lags is 25, whereas the Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) puts it at 27, but we opt for 25 in order to gain from parsimony. 
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4. Results 
 
Correlations and lead-lag relationships 
In order to gain some preliminary insights into the sources of comovements in the data, it is 
useful to examine the bivariate correlations (at various leads and lags of up to one year) 
between our set of endogenous variables, before characterizing the relationships more 
formally with the VAR analysis. Both uncertainty time series15 show strong evidence of serial 
correlation, which is more persistent for idiosyncratic uncertainty. There is also strong 
evidence of comovement between idiosyncratic and aggregate uncertainty, with the 
contemporaneous correlation being the strongest, and each series exhibiting positive and 
statistically significant correlations with the lagged value of the other up to 6 months. 
Although the correlations between lagged values of idiosyncratic uncertainty with 
contemporaneous aggregate uncertainty are slightly higher than the converse, the lead-lag 
relationship between the two uncertainty indices remains ambiguous. 
Table 1 below reports the pairwise correlations of our two uncertainty indices with 
industrial production growth. There is strong evidence that both uncertainty measures lead 
production, with all lagged (and contemporaneous) values exhibiting negative16 and highly 
statistically significant correlations with production up to one year. But notably, the 
correlations are stronger for idiosyncratic uncertainty, peaking at -0.39 after 6 months, and 
for aggregate uncertainty peaking at -0.26. For lead values, the evidence is weak - although 
both uncertainty series exhibit negative correlations with production, they are statistically 
significant only up to 3 months, and the magnitudes are considerably smaller. Thus the 
preliminary evidence on lead-lag relationships points to both uncertainty series leading 
production, rather than the converse. 
  
                                                          
15
 We report all correlations using the de-trended uncertainty measures only. 
16
 i.e. uncertainty is higher during recessions and lower during booms. 
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Lead/lag (months) Idiosyncratic uncertainty Aggregate uncertainty 
+12 -0.28** -0.13** 
+6 -0.40** -0.26** 
+3 -0.35** -0.24** 
0 -0.22** -0.15** 
-3 -0.12** -0.08* 
-6 -0.04 -0.03 
-12 0.07 0.04 
TABLE 1: CORRELATIONS WITH REAL INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION GROWTH 
NOTE: This table reports the lead, lagged and contemporaneous correlation structure of the aggregate and 
idiosyncratic uncertainty series (both de-trended) with real industrial production growth. * and ** indicate 
significance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Granger causality tests 
Next, we gain further insights by investigating to what extent the different uncertainty 
measures can forecast each other, and also forecast production growth and other 
endogenous variables. We do this by conducting Granger causality tests on each of the VAR 
equations. 
Starting with the full VAR system which includes all five endogenous variables, 
unsurprisingly, we find strong evidence that each uncertainty measure Granger causes the 
other. However, in the production equation, although tests for both inflation and the policy 
rate are statistically significant, neither of the uncertainty measures is. However, although 
these variables are not independently significant in terms of their forecasting power, this 
does not preclude their joint significance. Indeed, the lack of individual significance can be 
explained given that the two uncertainty measures are highly positively correlated. This, 
combined with the problem of our inclusion of numerous lags, means that the Granger 
causality test, which tests whether each of the uncertainty series is independently  
significant in forecasting production, is less likely to yield a positive result. Hence, to get 
round this, we repeat the exercise but include each individual uncertainty series 
sequentially in the VAR system. In both cases, the results are quite different. First, our 
results shed light on the lead-lag relationship between idiosyncratic uncertainty and 
production. We find that idiosyncratic uncertainty Granger causes production with a very 
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high significance level (whereas the tests for inflation and policy rate are no longer 
significant at the 5% level). In contrast, we find that production has very little predictive 
power for idiosyncratic uncertainty. 
Second, we also find aggregate uncertainty has forecasting power for production, but this is 
significantly weaker than with the idiosyncratic uncertainty measure. Furthermore, 
production has strong predictive power for aggregate uncertainty, hence the lead-lag 
relationship is more ambiguous for this uncertainty measure. 
Third, the results also lend support to the view that movements in aggregate uncertainty are 
primarily an endogenous response to macroeconomic fluctuations, with all three macro 
variables having significant forecasting power for our aggregate uncertainty measure. 
However, one cannot say the same for idiosyncratic uncertainty - only inflation has 
significant predictive ability for this variable. But analysis of the reduced form system is 
incapable of disentangling the underlying causal relationships, which requires that we move 
to a more structural model. 
Idiosyncratic uncertainty 
 yt πt MPt IUt 
yt-i - 0.014 0.000 0.234 
πt-i 0.069 - 0.746 0.000 
MPt-i 0.060 0.000 - 0.203 
IUt-i 0.002 0.000 0.063 - 
Aggregate uncertainty 
 yt πt MPt AUt 
yt-i - 0.017 0.000 0.010 
πt-i 0.024 - 0.756 0.005 
MPt-i 0.010 0.000 - 0.030 
AUt-i 0.014 0.000 1.000 - 
TABLE 2: GRANGER CAUSALITY 
NOTE: This table reports the p-values of Granger-causality VAR tests. The null hypothesis is that lags 1 through 
i of the series indicated in the row do not help to forecast the series indicated in the column, conditional on 
the other variables in the VAR. 
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VAR analysis 
In this section, we present further insights into the effects of shocks to our two different 
uncertainty measures on the macroeconomy, by undertaking Cholesky-orthogonalized 
impulse response functions (IRFs) and forecast error variance decompositions (FEVDs) on 
our set of endogenous variables. We present results for the whole economy idiosyncratic 
uncertainty index, and also compare these with the results for the disaggregated measures 
for large and small firms. 
IRFs 
Starting with the IRFs, an unanticipated increase in idiosyncratic uncertainty of one standard 
deviation causes a significant decline in real industrial production (in level terms), which falls 
by approximately ¾ of a percentage point below trend 18 months after impact. Growth falls 
rapidly over the course of a year, but then subsequently rebounds sharply, almost 2/3 of the 
way back to trend within the next 5 months.  The sharp drop and rapid rebound in growth is 
even more noticeable for idiosyncratic uncertainty shocks originating in the large firms 
sector, with the trough in growth rates slightly deeper, and the pace of recovery faster with 
growth almost back to trend within the following year. Their effects are of a similar order of 
magnitude to monetary policy shocks. 
The effects of an aggregate uncertainty shock are, however, more subdued, and also more 
protracted. Following impact, growth dips gently, bottoming out after a year, and also 
displays a much more gradual pace of recovery, with growth still below trend after another 
year. In level terms, production is only around ¼ of a percentage point below trend after 18 
months. 
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FIGURE 9: IMPULSE RESPONSE FUNCTIONS (EFFECTS OF SHOCKS ON INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION) 
The figure depicts the impulse responses of real industrial production growth to a one standard deviation 
orthogonalized shock to all variables. 
It is interesting to note that the profile of responses to an idiosyncratic uncertainty shock 
displays the characteristic rapid drop and subsequent rebound in activity characterized in 
Bloom (2009)17. His intuition for these effects is that firms respond to a surge in uncertainty 
by delaying major investment decisions and hiring decisions, due to the “real option” value 
of waiting. This happens rapidly because the uncertainty shock affects firms’ expectations 
about future business conditions, hence investment and hiring freezes are implemented 
with immediate effect. Once the uncertainty has dissipated, activity rebounds rapidly as 
firms address their pent-up demand for investment and hiring. However, the key difference 
is that Bloom associates this profile of responses with aggregate uncertainty shocks, 
whereas we find this for idiosyncratic, but not aggregate, uncertainty shocks. 
We also investigate long-run effects, and find that a typical idiosyncratic uncertainty shock 
results in a permanent loss in production of around ¾ of a percentage point after 5 years 
                                                          
17
 Although Bloom uses levels of production (relative to trend), whereas we use growth rates. 
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(regarding the sectoral decomposition, shocks to large firms result in a permanent loss of 
around the same magnitude, but for small firms it is smaller at around ½ a percentage 
point). We interpret this as due to the scaling down of investment plans and postponement 
of projects by firms during the period of heightened uncertainty. This results in an erosion of 
future productive potential. Although Bloom notes that firms attempt to “catch up” on 
foregone investment opportunities during the recovery phase, our findings suggest that 
they never fully do so18. In contrast, although monetary policy shocks have an equally severe 
effect on production in the short run, in the long run, the economy almost fully recoups 
these losses such that there is no permanent effect on the level of production, consistent 
with the behaviour of a traditional demand shock. But, as expected, supply shocks (i.e. 
shocks to production) have a significant, persistent effect on output, resulting in a loss of 
around ¾ of a percentage point after 5 years. Hence, the long-run effects of an idiosyncratic 
uncertainty shock are of the same order of magnitude as a supply shock. 
It is also of interest to examine the profile of responses of the uncertainty series themselves. 
We find that both uncertainty shocks decay quite rapidly, and are almost completely 
dissipated after a year19, suggesting that periods of heightened uncertainty tend to be quite 
short-lived. It is also noteworthy that idiosyncratic uncertainty shocks lead to a sizeable 
increase in aggregate uncertainty, but again this decays rapidly and then overshoots for 
quite a protracted period (in contrast, aggregate uncertainty shocks have almost no effect 
on idiosyncratic uncertainty). These results suggests that in addition to a direct transmission 
mechanism from idiosyncratic uncertainty to real activity, there may also be an indirect 
channel through which an idiosyncratic uncertainty shock leads to propagation of aggregate 
uncertainty, which in turn drives business cycle fluctuations. 
Finally, we examine the monetary policy response to uncertainty shocks. The IRFs indicate 
there is very little response to either type of uncertainty shock, suggesting that central 
banks tend not to ease policy significantly in the wake of spikes in uncertainty. However, the 
                                                          
18
 Alternatively, it might be that output takes longer to recover than our 5 year horizon (due to “time to build” 
investment lags etc.). However, running the IRFs up to 10 years does not affect the results, there is still a 
permanent loss in production of around ¾ of a percentage point. 
19
 although aggregate uncertainty actually overshoots slightly for the following year before returning to steady 
state. 
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standard error bands are quite wide, hence it is difficult to pin down with confidence the 
true policy response. 
FEVDs 
To gain insights into how significant are uncertainty shocks in driving business cycle 
fluctuations, relative to the standard macroeconomic shocks modelled here, we conduct 
FEVDs, running out to a five year horizon (in order to match average business cycle 
frequencies). We find that idiosyncratic uncertainty shocks account for a large fraction of 
output fluctuations over most of the forecast range, dominating all other shocks with the 
exception of supply shocks. In contrast, the fraction attributed to aggregate uncertainty 
shocks is negligible throughout. 
In the short-term (less than 6 months after impact), the contribution of idiosyncratic 
uncertainty is relatively small, with supply shocks dominating and accounting for over 80% 
of fluctuations in production. However, the effects of idiosyncratic uncertainty shocks 
propagate rapidly, peaking at more than 30% after 2 years, and stay around this level for the 
duration. The proportion attributed to aggregate uncertainty shocks starts off small, and 
stays low at around 5% throughout. Looking at the sectoral decomposition of idiosyncratic 
uncertainty shocks, we find that for large firms, the proportion of fluctuations in production 
accounted for is actually higher at around 35% after 2 years, whereas for small firms is lower 
at around 25% at a similar forecast horizon. 
Interestingly, the contribution of monetary policy shocks is significantly lower than 
idiosyncratic uncertainty shocks, at less than 20% after 2 years, albeit increasing slightly to 
25%20 by the end of the 5 year forecast horizon. Inflation shocks, however, have a negligible 
impact throughout. 
                                                          
20
 consistent with several estimates reported in the existing literature. 
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FIGURE 10: FORECAST ERROR VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION 
The figure depicts the forecast error variance decomposition of real industrial production growth from one 
standard deviation orthogonalized shocks to idiosyncratic and aggregate uncertainty. 
It is also useful to analyze the factors driving movements in the uncertainty measures 
themselves. Regarding idiosyncratic uncertainty, this is mainly self-driven by idiosyncratic 
uncertainty shocks, although monetary policy also plays a significant role. This suggests that 
idiosyncratic uncertainty is a primitive force driving fluctuations, as opposed to an 
endogenous response reflecting other macroeconomic factors. In contrast, aggregate 
uncertainty is driven significantly by all our candidate shocks (with the exception of 
inflation), with idiosyncratic uncertainty shocks having the largest effect. Thus, it appears 
that fluctuations in aggregate uncertainty are mostly an endogenous response to other 
disturbances in the macroeconomy. 
Shocks Industrial 
production 
Inflation Policy rate 
Idiosyncratic 31 19 1 
Aggregate 5 2 2 
TABLE 3: FORECAST ERROR VARIANCE DECOMPOSITIONS 
NOTE: This table reports the percentage contributions of one standard deviation orthogonalized shocks to 
idiosyncratic and aggregate uncertainty to other endogenous variables, at a 24 month forecast horizon. 
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5. Comparing the effects of large and small firms’ uncertainty 
shocks 
 
A somewhat puzzling finding is that when we aggregate up the individual shares of 
fluctuations in production attributed to large and small firms, the numbers do not seem to 
add up to what we get for the whole economy idiosyncratic uncertainty shocks. Specifically, 
at a 2 year forecast horizon, the share of output fluctuations attributed to uncertainty 
shocks for large firms is around 35%, whereas for small firms it is around 25%. But for the 
aggregated equivalent of the idiosyncratic uncertainty series, the figure is around 30%. 
Hence, around 30% of output fluctuations seems to be missing. 
 
FIGURE 11: COMPARING LARGE AND SMALL FIRMS – FEVDS 
The figure depicts the forecast error variance decomposition of real industrial production growth from one 
standard deviation orthogonalized shocks to idiosyncratic uncertainty of large firms and small firms. 
This puzzle might be explained by omitted variable bias – the idiosyncratic uncertainty series 
for large and small firms are highly correlated, hence given that we include the large (small) 
firms index in isolation in the VAR, it is plausible that its contribution to economic 
fluctuations is biased upwards, as it captures the effects of small (large) firms also. This 
would effectively lead to a problem of “double-counting” when summing together the 
individual contributions of large and small firms’ uncertainty shocks. However, this 
explanation is unsatisfactory in that it does not explain why the contribution of large firms’  
shocks (35%) actually exceeds that of the aggregated equivalent (30%). 
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To investigate further, we reformulate the VAR to include both large and small firm 
idiosyncratic uncertainty indices simultaneously, but omit inflation and interest rates in 
order to avoid the problem of over-parameterization from including too many endogenous 
variables. We then replicate this VAR model, but substitute the two disaggregated 
uncertainty series with the single aggregated equivalent, and compare the results. Our 
results are consistent with the previous formulation. From a two year forecast horizon 
onwards, the contribution of large and small firms shocks sums to around 25%, whereas the 
aggregated equivalent only accounts for around 15%21. 
Our proposed resolution of this puzzle is based on the pattern of comovements of large and 
small firms’ shocks with production. Although there is a strong positive contemporaneous 
correlation between the innovations of large and small firm uncertainty measures, they 
appear to co-move with production in opposite directions over certain stages of the 
business cycle, with a large (small) firms’ shock having a positive (negative) impact on 
production. Hence, there appears to be an economy-wide “buffering effect” in operation, 
which dampens down the aggregate effects of idiosyncratic uncertainty shocks on economic 
fluctuations. Inspecting the IRFs for the effects of shocks to large and small firms on activity, 
we find supportive evidence of this. Although both sectors experience steep initial drops in 
production, large firms recover more rapidly and more vigorously than small firms, with 
growth turning sharply positive for large firms around 18 months after impact, whereas as 
for small firms it remains negative. 
                                                          
21
 We also check whether this puzzling phenomenon is an artefact of the unique episode in the late 1990s - 
early 2000s which saw a significant increase in idiosyncratic uncertainty due to the incidence of the Dotcom 
bubble and bust. However, re-estimating the VARs but excluding the time period 1998Q4-2001Q4 from the 
sample, we find that our results are robust. 
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FIGURE 12: COMPARING LARGE AND SMALL FIRMS – IRFS 
The figure depicts the impulse responses of real industrial production growth to one standard deviation 
orthogonalized shocks to idiosyncratic uncertainty of large firms and small firms. 
Our intuition for these observed effects is as follows. An idiosyncratic uncertainty shock 
would likely result in increased cash-flow volatility, thus exacerbating financial frictions and 
making it harder for firms to fund investment through bank lending. However, large firms 
would be less constrained by tighter bank credit rationing than small firms, given that they 
are more able to draw on internal equity due to stronger balance sheets and liquidity 
positions, and also able to access external equity and bond markets, which are generally 
closed to small firms. Thus, large firms would have a better opportunity to expand and grab 
market share from their (shrinking) smaller rivals. We formalize this intuition as follows. 
We start with the benchmark case in which we use the aggregated idiosyncratic uncertainty 
series in the VAR. Assuming the VAR is stable, we can re-write it in vector moving-average 
form: 
 
𝑋𝑡 = 𝜇 + ∑ 𝜑𝑠𝑢𝑡−𝑠
∞
𝑠=0
 (14) 
where X is an M-variate stochastic process, µ is a vector of time-invariant means, and u is a 
vector of innovations with 𝑢𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝛴). It is more useful to look at the MA representation 
with orthogonal innovations. Factorization of Σ yields: 
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 𝐹𝐹′ = Σ      and    𝐺ΣG′ = I (15) 
where 𝐺 = 𝐹−1, which allows us to re-write (14) as: 
 
𝑋𝑡 = 𝜇 + ∑ 𝜑𝑠𝐹𝑣𝑡−𝑠
∞
𝑠=0
 (16) 
where 𝑢𝑡 = 𝐹𝑣𝑡 and 𝐸𝑣𝑡𝑣𝑡
′ = 𝐼. Denoting 𝜑𝑠
∗ = 𝜑𝑠𝐹, the K-step ahead forecast error is: 
 
𝑋𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡−𝑘[𝑋𝑡] = ∑ 𝜑𝑠
∗𝑣𝑡−𝑠
𝐾−1
𝑠=0
 (17) 
Given the standard SVAR assumption of mutual orthogonality of v, the variance-covariance 
matrix of the K-step ahead forecast errors is given by ∑ 𝜑𝑠
∗𝐾−1
𝑠=0 𝜑𝑠
∗′. Isolating our specific 
variable of interest, production (denoted y), the k-step ahead forecast error is given by: 
 
𝑦𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡−𝑘[𝑦𝑡] = ∑ 𝑎𝑖
11
𝑘−1
𝑖=0
𝜀1𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝑎𝑖
12
𝑘−1
𝑖=0
𝜀2𝑡−𝑖 + ⋯ + ∑ 𝑎𝑖
1𝑚
𝑘−1
𝑖=0
𝜀𝑚𝑡−𝑖 (18) 
where 𝑎𝑖
𝑝𝑞 denotes the pth row and qth column of matrix 𝜑𝑖
∗. Hence, the k-step ahead 
forecast error variance for variable y is given by: 
 
𝐸(𝑦𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡−𝑘[𝑦𝑡])
2 = 𝜎1
2 ∑(𝑎𝑖
11)2
𝑘−1
𝑖=0
+ 𝜎2
2 ∑(𝑎𝑖
12)2
𝑘−1
𝑖=0
+ ⋯ + 𝜎𝑚
2 ∑(𝑎𝑖
1𝑚)2
𝑘−1
𝑖=0
 (19) 
where the mth variable denotes the IV series. 
Next, we compare with the case in which we replace the aggregated idiosyncratic 
uncertainty series with the disaggregated counterparts for large and small firms, denoted by 
variables m and m+1 respectively. As previously, we assume: 
 𝐸[𝑣𝑡𝑣𝑠′] = 0𝐾      𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙  𝑠 ≠ 𝑡 (20) 
However, unlike previously, we have: 
 𝐸[𝑣𝑡𝑣𝑡′] ≠ 𝐼𝐾 (21) 
given there exists a non-zero contemporaneous correlation between the two sectoral 
idiosyncratic uncertainty series. Thus, the k-step ahead forecast error variance for variable y 
becomes: 
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 𝐸(𝑦𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡−𝑘[𝑦𝑡])
2
= 𝜎1
2 ∑(𝑎𝑖
11)2
𝑘−1
𝑖=0
+ ⋯ + 𝜎𝑚+1
2 ∑(𝑎𝑖
1𝑚+1)2
𝑘−1
𝑖=0
+ 2 ∑ 𝑎𝑖
1𝑚𝑎𝑖
1𝑚+1𝐸(𝜀𝑚𝑡−𝑖
𝑘−1
𝑖=0
𝜀𝑚+1𝑡−𝑖) 
(22) 
We assume the sectoral idiosyncratic uncertainty series are covariance stationary, i.e. 
 𝐸(𝜀𝑚𝑡−𝑖𝜀𝑚+1𝑡−𝑖) = 𝜎𝑚,𝑚+1   𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖 (23) 
Substituting (23) into (22) yields: 
 𝐸(𝑦𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡−𝑘[𝑦𝑡])
2
= 𝜎1
2 ∑(𝑎𝑖
11)2
𝑘−1
𝑖=0
+ ⋯ + 𝜎𝑚+1
2 ∑(𝑎𝑖
1𝑚+1)2
𝑘−1
𝑖=0
+ 2𝜎𝑚,𝑚+1 ∑ 𝑎𝑖
1𝑚𝑎𝑖
1𝑚+1
𝑘−1
𝑖=0
 
(24) 
Next, let ?̃?(𝑦𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡−𝑘[𝑦𝑡])
2 denote the mis-specified forecast error variance in which 
mutual orthogonality is assumed between all innovations, hence: 
 
?̃?(𝑦𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡−𝑘[𝑦𝑡])
2 = ?̃?1
2 ∑(?̃?𝑖
11)2
𝑘−1
𝑖=0
+ ⋯ + ?̃?𝑚+1
2 ∑(?̃?𝑖
1𝑚+1)2
𝑘−1
𝑖=0
 (25) 
where ?̃?𝑖
𝑝𝑞 denotes the pth row and qth column of matrix ?̃?𝑖
∗, and ?̃?𝑖
∗ is the equivalent of 
𝜑𝑖
∗ in the previous case above. 
Thus, given 𝜎𝑚,𝑚+1 > 0, 
 
?̃?(𝑦𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡−𝑘[𝑦𝑡])
2 > 𝐸(𝑦𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡−𝑘[𝑦𝑡])
2 ⇔ ∑ 𝑎𝑖
1𝑚𝑎𝑖
1𝑚+1
𝑘−1
𝑖=0
< 0 (26) 
which requires 𝑎𝑖
1𝑚, 𝑎𝑖
1𝑚+1 to have opposite signs over some portion of the forecast 
horizon. 
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6. Robustness checks 
 
We begin by investigating the robustness of our results to different orderings of variables in 
the VAR. We find that the key flavour of our results continues to hold for a variety of 
different orderings. In particular, we check whether our results are sensitive to the decision 
to order idiosyncratic before aggregate uncertainty in the VAR. Ordering the aggregate 
uncertainty variable first, and again repeating the exercise with this variable taking all other 
possible positions in the estimation order, we find that the share of fluctuations in activity 
attributed to aggregate uncertainty shocks remains negligible, and never exceeds the share 
reached in our original formulation.22 
Next, we completely reverse the order of variables compared to the original formulation, 
with production entering first and idiosyncratic uncertainty last. Here, we find that both 
types of uncertainty shocks become relatively insignificant in explaining fluctuations in 
activity, however repeating this exercise for large firms only reveals a different result. The 
contribution of idiosyncratic uncertainty shocks remains significant (despite being last in the 
ordering), peaking at around 15%, although only half its magnitude in the original 
formulation. However, aggregate uncertainty remains insignificant, despite being positioned 
before idiosyncratic uncertainty in the estimation order. 
We also investigate whether our results are affected by a problem of over-parameterization, 
due to inclusion of five endogenous variables and a large number of lags. We drop the 
inflation variable from the VAR, as this consistently has the smallest forecasting power for 
fluctuations in activity in our previous estimations, but otherwise we retain the original 
estimation order. We find that the fraction explained by idiosyncratic uncertainty shocks 
peaks at over 20%, whereas aggregate uncertainty never exceeds 2%. Reversing the 
estimation order, the results remain robust with idiosyncratic uncertainty shocks remaining 
significant, and double that of aggregate uncertainty shocks which remains at approximately 
only 5%, despite being ordered before idiosyncratic uncertainty. Again, the effects are 
stronger for large firms, in the reverse ordering the impact of idiosyncratic uncertainty 
shocks peaks at over 20%, approximately 4 times that for aggregate uncertainty. 
                                                          
22
 Indeed, we try 20 different orderings and the contribution of aggregate uncertainty remains negligible for all 
of these, even when it is placed first in the ordering. 
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Robustness to structural breaks 
Another concern is that the possibility of structural breaks within our estimation period 
might affect the results. Our first concern is with the well-documented “Great Moderation”, 
i.e. the  period of significantly diminished output volatility, occurring from the mid-1980s 
(McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000)) until the outbreak of the financial crisis of 2008, and 
also the incidence of more efficient monetary policy-making and reduced occurrence of 
monetary policy shocks, occurring from around 1990 (Cecchetti et al. (2006)). Our interest 
here is whether the effects of idiosyncratic uncertainty might also suffer from a 
“moderated” impact during this time period. We investigate whether our results are robust 
to these effects by re-estimating the VAR, FEVDs and IRFs but with the sample period 
truncated in 1990. 
Our key results appear to be unaffected by the possibility of structural breaks. On the 
contrary, breaking the sample at 199023, we find the share of fluctuations in activity 
attributed to idiosyncratic uncertainty shocks increases significantly to approximately 45% 
at a two year forecast horizon (compared with the whole sample estimate of around 30%), 
whilst aggregate uncertainty shocks remain insignificant at around 5%. The time profile of 
responses to uncertainty shocks also remains similar – an idiosyncratic uncertainty shock 
leads to a sharp fall and rapid rebound in output, whereas an aggregate uncertainty shock 
induces a more gradual and persistent decline. Also consistent with previous results, 
idiosyncratic uncertainty shocks to large firms account for a larger share of fluctuations in 
activity than to small firms (45% as opposed to 35% for the latter). 
Our second concern is that our results might be distorted by the effects of a unique episode 
in the late 1990s - early 2000s which saw a significant increase in idiosyncratic uncertainty 
due to the incidence of the Dotcom bubble and bust. However, re-estimating the VAR but 
excluding the relevant time period (1998Q4-2001Q4)24 from the sample, we find that our 
results continue to hold, and if anything are actually reinforced. Specifically, the share of 
fluctuations in activity attributed to idiosyncratic uncertainty shocks increases significantly 
                                                          
23
 Breaking the sample at different points during the mid-1980s to 1990 yields similar results. 
24
 Bekaert et al. (2012) test for structural breaks for these effects and find the ends of 1997/1998 and 
2001/2002 are consistently identified as break points. 
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to approximately 40% after two years, whereas aggregate uncertainty shocks become even 
more insignificant, with their share falling to 0% (to a first order approximation). 
7. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper, we study jointly the roles of aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainty shocks in 
driving business cycle fluctuations. By decomposing total stock return uncertainty of over 
20,000 publicly-listed US firms, we construct separate indices for aggregate and 
idiosyncratic uncertainty, and run a horse race between them in an otherwise standard 
macroeconomic VAR. We find that idiosyncratic uncertainty shocks account for 
approximately 30% of volatility in industrial production at business cycle frequencies, larger 
than the share attributed to monetary policy shocks. They generate a significant decline in 
real economic activity, and exhibit the characteristic “sharp drop and rapid rebound” 
response identified in Bloom (2009). In contrast, aggregate uncertainty shocks have a much 
more muted impact, with their contribution to volatility in industrial production little more 
than 5%. Idiosyncratic uncertainty shocks to large firms also have more powerful 
macroeconomic impacts than small firms, suggesting “Granular” origins to the role of 
uncertainty in the macroeconomy. 
We also shed light on the transmission mechanisms of uncertainty shocks to the real 
economy. Our findings are supportive of the channel identified in Bloom (2009), in which 
greater uncertainty increases the real option value to waiting, hence firms scale back their 
investment and hiring plans. In contrast, our evidence casts doubt on the mechanism 
formulated in CMR (2012), which predicts that smaller firms would be more significantly 
affected by uncertainty shocks than larger firms. 
One possible direction for future research would be to investigate the propagation 
mechanisms through which such Granular effects might arise. In particular, it would be 
interesting to explore whether there are general equilibrium effects through which an 
idiosyncratic uncertainty shock to a large firm might permeate throughout the economy as a 
whole, and how this depends on the interconnectedness of firms. 
Another promising extension would be to investigate more deeply the causal relationships 
between idiosyncratic uncertainty and key macroeconomic variables. Although our research 
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shows that these shocks generate significant impacts on the real economy, a fully structural 
model is required to tackle the identification problem. 
Finally, it is also of interest to investigate the optimal policy response to idiosyncratic 
uncertainty shocks, and the differences between policy responses to aggregate and 
idiosyncratic uncertainty shocks. But these, and other interesting questions, are left for 
future research. 
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